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Toward The Abolition Of
Interspousal Tort Immunity
by Michael N. Gambrill
The idea that one cannot sue his or her spouse for a
tort is deeply entrenched in Anglo-American common
law. The concept is known as the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity. Since the development of the doctrine
during the fuedalistic period of England, it has shown a
great deal of resistance to change. Only recently has the
doctrine come under attack and been eroded in the
American courts. A number of courts have partially
abrogated the doctrine by limiting its use as a defense to
particular torts. Others have completely abolished the
doctrine. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, Cal.2d 692, 26 Cal.
Reptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962); Brooks v. Robinson, 259
Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Beaudette v. Frana, 285
Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Maestas v. Overton
87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975); and Freehe v. Freehe,
81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
At common law, husband and wife were presumed for
legal purposes to be identical. Because of this presump-
tion, all of the property which a wife owned at marriage
became solely the property of the husband. Women
could not enter into contracts. A wife could not sue or be
sued. If the wife was injured in her person or property,
she could only bring an action with her husband's name
and with his concurrence. Neither could she be sued
without her husband as a defendant. In 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries, this explanation is found:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person
in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the hus-
band: under whose wing, protection, cover, she
performs everything... and her condition upon mar-
riage is called her coverture. Id at 442.
Until the Married Women's Act of 1898, the English
common law treatment of women was followed in Mary-
land. The common law was somewhat limited by the
Married Women's Act of 1898, which is found in Md.
Ann. Code Art. 45, sec. 5. That section provides that:
Married women shall have the power to engage in
any business, and to contract, whether engaged in
business or not and to sue upon their contracts, and
also to sue for the recovery, security or protection of
their property, and for the torts committed against
them, as fully as if they were unmarried; contracts
may also be made with them, and they may also be
sued separately upon their contracts, whether made
before or during marriage, as fully as if they were un-
married; nor shall any husband be liable upon any con-
tract made by his wife in her own name and upon her
own responsibility, nor for any tort committed separ-
ately by her out of his presence, without his participa-
tion or sanction.
Clearly, the statute permits women to enter contracts on
their own behalf. It is also clear that a woman may sue on
her own behalf without obtaining the concurrence of her
husband or using his name as was required by common
law. The necessity of naming a husband as a defendant in
order to sue a woman is also abolished by the statute.
Logically, if a woman can sue for torts committed
against her as fully as if she was unmarried, then she
should be able to sue her husband. Maryland courts
were first faced with this problem in Furstenburg v.
Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136A.534 (1927). Confronted
with a suit by a wife against her husband for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident, the court was very
conservative in its construction of Art. 45, sec. 5. In
Furstenburg, the court relied upon Thompson v.
Thompson, , 218 U.S.611 (1910) in which the Supreme
Court construed a District of Columbia statute similar to
Art. 45, sec. 5. The majority in Thompson wrote, "The
statute was not intended to give a right of action as
against the husband but to allow the wife, in her own
name, to maintain an action of tort which at common law
must be brought in the joint names of herself and her hus-
band." Id. at 617
Rationalizing this construction of the District of
Columbia statute, the court pointed out that such a long
established doctrine as interspousal immunity could only
be abrogated "by language so clear and plain as to be
unmistakeable evidence of the legislative intention."
Judge Urner found for the Maryland court, in Fursten-
burg, that sec. 5 was not meant to be as broad and
unqualified as it appeared. There was no express evi-
dence of an intent to abrogate interspousal immunity and
therefore, the doctrine barred the wife's suit in Fursten-
burg.
After years of suggesting that abrogation of the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity was a legislative function,
the Maryland Court of Appeals took it upon itself to abo-
lish the doctrine partially. In Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md.
334, 390 A.2d 77, 77 (1978), the Court held, "that under
the facts and circumstances of this case, amounting to an
outrageous, intentional tort, a wife may sue her husband
for damages."
As the court points out, the facts are extraordinary
and do dictate the results of the case. Diana R. Lusby
alleged that her husband, Gerald Lee Lusby, and two of
his companions used their vehicles to force her vehicle
off the road. Once she stopped, her husband
approached her automobile with a rifle pointed at her,
forced his way into the automobile and began to drive.
Mr. Lusby proceeded to take her to another location
with his friends following in one of the other vehicles.
Then, it was "alleged that her husband struck her, tore
[her] clothes off and did forcefully and violently, despite
[her] desperate attempts to protect herself, carnally
know [her] against her will and without her consent."' Id.
at 77. Mr. Lusby proceeded to help his two companions
in their attempt to rape his wife. Before releasing Mrs.
Lusby, he threatened to kill her if she went to the police.
After that day, he continued to harrass and threaten her.
When Mrs. Lusby filed suit against her husband for the
injuries sustained by her from this act, Mr. Lusby raised a
preliminary objection asserting a lack of legal capacity on
the part of his wife to sue. His objection was based on the
fact that he and the plaintiff were legally married on the
date of the alleged incident. Thus, he believed that this
fact entitled him to raise as an absolute defense, the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity. The trial judge granted
the motion and a judgment for costs was entered against
the wife in favor of the husband. An appeal was filed with
the Court of Special Appeals and prior to consideration
by the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals, in Lusby draws considerable
support for partially abrogating the interspousal im-
munity doctrine from the dissent in Thompson. Justices
Harlan, Holmes and Hughes, who are characterized by
the Maryland Court as "three of the great minds of the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1910," join in dis-
sent. Justice Harlan writing for the dissent observes that,
[The statute] proceeds to authorize married women
'also to sue separately for the recovery, security or
protection of their property; still more, they may sue
separately, 'for torts committed against them, as fully
and freely as if they were unmarried.' No discrimina-
tion is made, in either case, between the persons
charged with committing the tort. No exception is
made in reference to the husband, if he happens to be
the party charged with transgressing the rights con-
ferred upon the wife by statute. In other words, Con-
gress, by these statutory provisions, destroys the
unity of the marriage association as it previously
existed.
But my brethern.. .are moved to add, by construc-
tion, to the provision that married women may 'sue
separately.. for torts committed against them as fully
and freely as if they were unmarried' these words:
'Provided, however, that the wife shall not be entitled,
in any case, to sue her husband separately for a tort
committed against her person.' Thompson, supra at
622-3.
Judge Smith points out that much of what Justice Harlan
said would be applicable to an analysis of the Maryland
act.
The Lusby court points to a lack of policy reasons for
preventing one spouse from recovering from another for
the outrageous conduct alleged. Perhaps, the most
widely propounded reason for continuing to allow the de-
fense of interspousal immunity is the preservation of fai-
ily harmony. In Lusby where an intentional tort was
involved, the Court declared, "[t]here certainly can be
no domestic tranquility." Refusing to accept this reason
as other courts have for upholding the doctrine, the
Court went on to cite an earlier decision (which upheld
the doctrine on different grounds). "[I]n Gregg v. Gregg,
199 Md. 662, 87 A.2d 581 (1952), Chief Judge Marbury
said for the Court, 'After discord, suspicion and distrust
have entered the home, it is idle to say that one of the par-
ties shall not be allowed to sue the other because of fear
of bringing in what is already there.' "Lusby, supra at 88.
After discussing the reasons for completely abolishing
interspousal immunity, the Lusby court stopped short of
doing so. In a very conservative step, the Court of
Appeals limited its holding to intentional torts of an out-
rageous nature,
For purposes of our decision here today, however,
we need not be involved with statutory construction
nor need we be involved with our prior cases other
than for dicta appearing in them to the effect that one
spouse may not sue another for tort. We find nothing
in our prior cases or elsewhere to indicate that under
the common law of Maryland a wife was not permitted
to recover from her husband in tort when she alleged
and proved the type of outrageous, intentional con-
duct here alleged. (emphasis added) Lusby, supra at
89.
Clearly, the cases which have upheld the doctrine of
interspousal immunity such as Furstenburg, supra, were
left standing although their rationale was shaken by
Lusby.
At the same time Lusby was decided, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia decided Coffindaffer
v. Coffindaffer, _W. Va. -, 244 S.E. 2d 338 (1978).
That case involved both an intentional tort and a negli-
gent tort. In completely abolishing interspousal immu-
nity, the Court, relying upon Thompson, supra for many
of the same reasons the Maryland Court of Appeals
found in the dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan, over-
ruled an earlier West Virginia case to the contrary. The
Court, in Coffindaffer, also examined the family har-
mony rationale, saying, "[L]t is difficult to see how any law
barring access to the courts for personal injuries will pro-
mote harmony. If this were a valid sociological considera-
tion, the Legislature could orchestrate even greater
harmony by abolishing the statute giving the right to
divorce." Id. at 342.
Two other reasons commonly put forth for continuing
to grant interspousal immunity, were also discussed by
the Court in Coffindaffer. The first, fraud and collusion
between the spouses is directly linked to the second, the
possibility of increased liability of insurance companies.
FORUM
In answer to the fraud and collusion argument, the
Court expressed its belief that the integrity of the adver-
sary system could not be so easily beguiled. In addition
the Court said,
[ln suits for personal injuries the issue is not only lia-
bility, as such cases assume real proportions only if
there are valid personal injuries of some magnitude.
There may be those desperate couples who would
conclude that the prospect of a substantial monetary
recovery is worth the pain of self inflicted injuries. One
can hardly imagine that the legal system will break
down with cases brought by spouses who have flung
themselves down cellar steps or permitted the other
spouse to strike them with the family car in order to
achieve the type of substantial injury that makes jury
litigation worthwhile. Id. at 342-3.
As for the insurance companies, the Court expressed
the feeling that adequate use of discovery methods
would alert them to the falsity of the claim.
In Freehe, supra, the Court discussed another answer
frequently found in the cases that refuse to allow suits in
tort between spouses:
A third reason advanced in support of maintaining the
common-law rule of disability is the suggestion that
the injured spouse has an adequate remedy through
the criminal and divorce laws. It has been observed
that neither of these alternatives actually compen-
sates for the damage done, or provides any remedy
for unintentional (negligent) torts. Id. at 774.
We are cognizant of the long standing nature of the
common law rule of interspousal tort immunity. But
we find more impelling the fundamental precept that,
absent express statutory provision or compelling pub-
lic policy, the law should not immunize tort-feasors or
deny remedy to their victims. Id. at 777.
In the future, the Court of Appeals in Maryland may
eliminate the doctrine of interspousal immunity without
reservation. The dicta in Lusby, supra, should aid greatly
in overcoming the doctrine when raised as a defense in a
negligence or less severe intentional tort injury case.
That dicta combined with the precedent of cases from
other jurisdictions, which have abolished the doctrine,
may aid the many battered wives of today's society. A
spouse should not have to wait for the occurence of an
outrageous intentional tort or have to rely on a divorce to
be compensated for losses or injuries.
POETIC LICENSE
by Jeffrey Kluger
"The Supreme Court will never entertain the notion of
tampering with the sanctity of the application and inter-
pretation of the nation's abundant crop of social idioms,
fables and popular cliches."
-Warren Earl Burger
So spoke the Chief Justice at last year's American Bar
Association convention in Kansas City. Yet less than ten
months later, the Court "tampered" indeed, and in so
doing, elected to overturn one of American culture's
hoarier, more entrenched cliches.
Pippin v. Rufo, 98 S.Ct. 653 (1979), the Court's
response to long gathering judicial storm clouds,
emerged as the linch-pin of a rapidly accelerating move-
ment designed, as one activist noted, "to overthrow the
vise-like tyranny of ancient platitudes." The case posed
the question of whether, when the going gets tough, the
tough must indeed get going.
"Not necessarily," responded the court.
The Pippin plaintiff alleged due process violations
when his tenure as a member of a semi-professional foot-
ball team was abruptly rescinded for failure to comply
with the basic tenets of the motto. The Court, finding in
favor of the plaintiff, held that "athletic exhortations are
not of such a sacred, inviolable character that they may
be exempted out-of-hand from the guarantees of the
14th amendment. Constitutional imperatives must bind
uniformly both the profound and the banal." Having thus
established the justiciability of the case, the Court
ordered the reinstatement of the aggrieved athlete based
upon the team's "wholesale failure to provide its players
with notice as to the precise moment at which the going
got tough and the requisite subsequent behavior suffi-
cient to constitute the ideal of getting going."
The ruling stunned most judicial insiders. With un-
accustomed suddenness, the Court discarded one of its
most venerable policies, spurning in a single holding two
hundred years of laissez-faire deference. "The flood-
gates are open," remarked one senior Washington advo-
cate, "now all that remains is to brave the people's cries
of 'foul.' "
Despite such dire forecasts, public response to the
Pippin initiative has been generally supportive. The Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars, electing uncharacteristically to
comply voluntarily with the spirit of the decision,
announced last week that it has designated January 1,
1981 as the formal expiration date of the public's respon-
sibility for collective recollection of the historic Alamo
conflict and promised a study to examine the feasibility of
similar action regarding The Maine, Lusitania and Pearl
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